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THE DEVELOPING LAW ON AIDS IN THE WORKPLACE
JANA HOWARD CAREY*
AND MEGAN M. ARTHUR**
I. INTRODUCTION
It was little more than five years ago, on June 5, 1981, that the
federal Centers for Disease Control (CDC) first reported that an un-
named condition had caused a collapse of immune systems in five
previously healthy homosexual men. Since then, the nation's con-
cern about Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) has
steadily escalated as headlines report more frightening develop-
ments. We now know that AIDS is a new, deadly, and rapidly
spreading disease.' Currently no test can pinpoint exactly who will
develop it,2 and there is no cure.3 Death is the certain result, and its
* Partner, Venable, Baetjer and Howard, Baltimore, Md.; B.S., Auburn University,
1967; M.S., Towson State University, 1973;J.D., University of Baltimore School of Law,
1976.
** Associate, Venable, Baetjer and Howard, Baltimore, Md.; B.A., Loyola College,
1983; J.D., University of Maryland School of Law, 1986.
1. One commentator has stated that the AIDS cases today are just "the tip of the
iceberg" and that the number will increase drastically in a few years. The problem is not
limited, moreover, to the 21,000 people currently suffering from AIDS or the 60,000 -
80,000 people with AIDS-related complex (ARC). A major dilemma exists because an
estimated 1 to 1.5 million persons are infected with the virus but are not yet displaying
any symptoms. See Dr. Harold M. Ginzburg, Comments to the Nat'l Conference on La-
bor (June 6, 1986), reported in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 112, at A-09 (June 11, 1986).
An official at the World Health Organization's AIDS program stated that there
could be 500,000 to 3 million AIDS cases worldwide unless preventive measures are
taken to stop its spread. Thus far, AIDS has been found in 78 countries, including many
in central Africa. Major increases in AIDS cases could occur in South America and Thai-
land, "where AIDS is 'knocking on the door.'" Reported in 1 AIDS Policy & Law (BNA)
No. 24, at 6-7 (Dec. 17, 1986).
2. The tests currently available detect only the antibodies to the AIDS virus. The
presence of these antibodies indicates no more than that the person has been exposed to
the AIDS virus. The tests cannot differentiate between those persons who will eventu-
ally develop the disease and those who will suffer no long-term effects from exposure.
See N.Y. DEP'T OF HEALTH, AIDS: 100 QUESTIONS & ANSWERS, Questions 50-51 (Jan. 1,
1986). Those who test positive for the presence of the AIDS virus are commonly called
"seropositive."
The ELISA (enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay) test, the most commonly used
test to detect the AIDS antibodies, was initially developed to screen potential blood
donors in order to ensure the safety of blood supplies. It is extremely sensitive to the
AIDS antibodies and results in a high "false positive rate" (i.e., AIDS antibodies are not
present even though the person tests positive for them). Thus, many ELISA positives
are retested and, if the result is still positive, confirmed with the Western Blot test, which
produces very few false positive results. The Western Blot test, however, produces false
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shroud falls quickly.4 While the great majority of the evidence indi-
cates that AIDS is not spread by casual workplace contact,' much
about the disease remains a mystery. Because AIDS victims include
a high percentage of homosexual men and users of illegal drugs,
6
negatives at a significant rate. A positive result on either the ELISA or Western Blot test
can mean any of the following:
1. The person has been exposed to the virus and will eventually develop
AIDS or ARC.
2. Exposure to the virus has occurred and the virus is alive within the
body, but the person will never develop AIDS.
3. The person has been exposed to the virus, but the immune system has
successfully fought off its invasion. The antibodies, however, still remain.
4. A technical error in the testing results creates a positive result even
though no exposure has occurred.
COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, AIDS, EMPLOYER RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 6 (Spe-
cial Report) (1985) [hereinafter AIDS, EMPLOYER RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES].
Researchers have found that a reduced level of serum antibody to the HLTV-III virus
is "significantly predictive of the development of AIDS." Polk, Predictors of the Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome Developing in a Cohort of Seropositive Homosexual Men, 316 NEW
ENG.J. OF MED. 61, 65 (1986). One suggested theory for this finding is that the antibody
levels decline as the immune system progressively succumbs to the disease. See id. This
fact suggests that persons with high levels of the serum antibody are less likely to ulti-
mately develop the disease.
3. Some scientists at first predicted a cure by 1986, but now it appears an AIDS
solution is at least five years away. See Siwolop, AIDS Drugs: Some Relief But Adverse Side
Effects, DISCOVER, Dec. 1985, at 38.
Anthony S. Fauci, coordinator of AIDS research at the National Institutes of Health,
told a Senate panel that human testing for an AIDS vaccine could begin at the end of
1987 or the beginning of 1988. He cautioned, however, that "'even if we do have a
vaccine, we don't expect it to be available for widespread use until well into the
1990's.' " Official Predicts Human Tests Soon in Search for an AIDS Vaccine, N.Y. Times, Jan.
16, 1987, at A12, col. 1.
4. The death rate is 80% two years after diagnosis and no AIDS patient is known to
have survived more than three years. AIDS, EMPLOYER RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES,
supra note 2, at 4.
5. The Centers for Disease Control (CDC), a branch of the United States Public
Health Service, published guidelines discussing the transmittal of AIDS: AIDS is not
spread by the kind of "nonsexual person-to-person contact that generally occurs among workers and
clients or consumers in the workplace, " including such settings as offices, schools, factories, and con-
struction sites. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, SUMMARY: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
PREVENTING TRANSMISSION OF INFECTION WITH HUMAN T-LYMPHOTROPIC VIRUS TYPE
III/LYMPHADENOPATHY-ASsOCIATED VIRUS IN THE WORKPLACE, reprinted in 34 MORBIDITY
AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 681, 682, 694 (Nov. 15, 1985) (emphasis added) [hereinaf-
ter CDC, RECOMMENDATIONS]. Workers known to be infected with the AIDS virus
should not be restricted from work on this account, nor should they be restricted from
using telephones, office equipment, toilets, showers, eating facilities, and water foun-
tains. Id. at 694. In the case of accidents in the work setting, equipment that is contami-
nated with blood or other body fluids from any worker, known to be infected or not,
should be cleaned with soap and water or a detergent. Id. A disinfectant or a fresh
solution of household bleach, as described in the guidelines, should be used to wipe the
area after the cleaning. Id.
6. As ofJanuary 30, 1987, there were 29,582 reported AIDS cases. The Centers for
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many consider the disease the result of illicit conduct, and its victims
are isolated not only by others' dread of catching the deadly disease
but also by others' notions of morality.
The new disease raises a myriad of thorny legal questions in all
the settings in which it has an impact-from the delivery room to the
mortuary. The workplace has been especially troubled with these
issues, largely because of the plethora of existing and sometimes
conflicting statutory safeguards of employee rights. The employer
who is confronted with an AIDS victim is on a legal tightrope be-
tween the rights of the sufferer and of those co-workers who fear
they may fall prey to the disease if the victim remains in their midst.
Because the disease is so new and resembles a modern pox or
plague that causes quick and certain death in an exponentially grow-
ing number of targets, very little law has developed to guide
employers.
This article will briefly outline the available medical facts about
AIDS and discuss the major legal issues those facts raise for employ-
ers. First, we will focus on whether AIDS victims are protected
under federal, state, and local statutes that prohibit discrimination
on the basis of handicap and other protected characteristics, such as
national origin or sexual preference. Second, we will examine the
extent to which the accumulation and disclosure of data about AIDS
victims violates their common-law and constitutional rights, and
whether the employer who fails to disclose the plight of an AIDS
victim to either the victim or co-workers runs any legal risks. Third,
we will look at other potential sources of employer liability to an
AIDS victim, such as unemployment compensation laws and com-
mon-law tort actions. Finally, we will examine the rights of the co-
workers of AIDS victims under the National Labor Relations Act,
Disease Control reports that 66% of the adult cases have occurred in sexually active
homosexual and bisexual men who had multiple partners; 8% occurred in homosexual
and bisexual men who use intravenous drugs; 17% occurred in present or past abusers
of intravenous drugs; 4% occurred in heterosexual persons who had some sexual con-
tact with someone with AIDS or at risk for AIDS; 2% occurred in adult transfusion recip-
ients; and 1% occurred in persons with hemophilia or other coagulation disorders. The
remaining 3% of adult AIDS patients do not fall into any of these groups and the way in
which they contracted the disease is still unknown. In children, 80% of the reported
cases occurred in children whose parents have AIDS or are at high risk for AIDS; 12% in
transfusion recipients; 5% in hemophiliacs; and in 3% the source of the disease is un-
known. Telephone inquiry to Surveillance and Evaluation Branch, United States AIDS
Program, Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control (Jan. 30, 1987)
(Tel. no. (404) 329-3534); see also CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, AIDS WEEKLY SUR-
VEILLANCE REP. 1 (Jan. 26, 1987).
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the Labor Management Relations Act, the Occupational Safety and
Health Act, and other pertinent statutes.
II. MEDICAL EVIDENCE
The AIDS virus, labeled Human T-lymphotropic Virus, Type
III (HTLV-III), attacks the body's immune system and renders it in-
capable of fighting off rare "opportunistic" diseases.7 The virus is
transmitted through sexual contact, blood transfusions, and needle
sharing by drug users.8 A child may contract the virus from an in-
fected mother immediately before, during, or after birth.9
Individuals infected with the AIDS virus develop antibodies,' 0
which can be detected by the ELISA (enzyme-linked immu-
nosorbent assay) and Western Blot tests. The presence of antibo-
dies, however, does not necessarily mean that the individual will get
AIDS," or even that the individual's body continues to harbor the
virus. 12
Symptoms associated with the AIDS disease include fever,
weight loss, fatigue, diarrhea, and swollen lymph nodes.' 3 They
may not surface until after an incubation period, the time between
infection with the virus and the onset of symptoms. This period
may vary from six months to five years or more.' 4
Once an individual develops AIDS, the victim's immune system
becomes so weakened that opportunistic diseases invade the body
and eventually cause death.' 5 The victim usually does not die of
AIDS but instead from a disease that ravages the body once the
AIDS virus has set the stage. The most common opportunistic dis-
7. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, FACTS ABOUT AIDS 1 (Aug. 1985)
[hereinafter FACTS ABOUT AIDS].
8. Id. at 2.
9. Id.
10. Researchers are not certain how long after exposure the antibodies develop. In
some cases antibodies have been detected four to seven weeks after exposure, while in
other cases antibodies had not been detected more than six months after exposure.
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, PROVISIONAL PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE INTER-AGENCY
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SCREENING DONATED BLOOD AND PLASMA FOR ANTIBODY TO THE
VIRUS CAUSING ACQUIRED IMMUNODEFICIENCY SYNDROME, reprinted in 34 MORBIDITY AND
MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 1 (Jan. 11, 1985).
11. Estimates suggest that an individual exposed to the virus has a 20% risk of devel-
oping "full-blown AIDS" and a 25% risk of developing a related condition. See Osborn,
The AIDS Epidemic: An Overview of the Science, ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, Winter
1986, at 40, 50.
12. See supra note 2.
13. See FACTS ABOUT AIDS, supra note 7.
14. Id. at 2.
15. See Langone, AIDS Special Report, DISCOVER, Dec. 1985, at 28, 52.
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eases include rare forms of pneumonia and skin cancer.' 6
Scientists and researchers currently believe that AIDS is not
transmitted through casual contact.' 7 One commentator has sug-
gested that, because AIDS is spread sexually and through blood and
blood products, "the keys to preventing transmission of the virus
are (1) the screening of all donated blood and (2) education and
other attempts to modify risky sexual behavior and intravenous drug
abuse."' 8 Most experts urge that persons who have only casual con-
tact with persons infected with AIDS (e.g., co-workers) are at virtu-
ally no risk of contracting AIDS. 19
Notwithstanding this medical evidence, near-hysteria about the
nature and transmission of the AIDS virus remains prevalent in
some quarters. According to a recent study, however, education can
reduce generalized fears about contracting the disease. Researchers
at the University of California at San Francisco found that members
of high-risk groups, who were well informed about AIDS, had less
general fear than individuals at little or no risk of contracting the
disease, who possessed little knowledge about it."° The study con-
cluded that public health information designed to educate individu-
als about AIDS could reduce this fear.2 '
III. LEGAL ISSUES
A. Are AIDS Victims Protected Against Employment Discrimination?
1. Do Handicap Discrimination Laws Cover AIDS Victims?-In as-
sessing employer obligations concerning AIDS victims, one critical
legal issue is whether AIDS will be considered a handicap under
laws that prohibit employment discrimination against handicapped
individuals. If AIDS is a handicap, an employer not only is obli-
gated to refrain from discrimination but also may have a duty to
make reasonable accommodations for any AIDS-related impedi-
ments to an afflicted employee's ability to work.
16. Pneumocystis carinii, a lung infection caused by parasites, and Kaposi's sarcoma,
a skin cancer, are the two most common diseases that attack AIDS victims. Id.
17. See, e.g., CDC, RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 5, at 681 ("AIDS is a bloodborne,
sexually transmitted disease that is not spread by casual contact .... ); Friedland, Saltz-
man, Rogers, Kahl, Lesser, Mayers & Klein, Lack of Transmission of HTLV-II/LAV Infection
to Household Contacts of Patients with AIDS or AIDS-Related Complex with Oral Candidiasis, 314
NEw ENG. J. OF MED. 344 (1986); Sande, Transmission of AIDS: The Case Against Casual
Contagion, 314 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 380 (1986).
18. Sande, supra note 17, at 382.
19. E.g., id.
20. Reported in 1 AIDS Policy & Law (BNA) No. 17, at 8 (Sept. 10, 1986).
21. Id.
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a. Is AIDS a Handicap?." Federal Law.-Until the Supreme
Court's decision on March 3, 1987, in School Board of Nassau County,
Florida v. Arline,22 discussed below, the most significant opinion on
whether AIDS is a handicap had been a memorandum issued by the
United States Department of Justice (the Memorandum).23 The
Memorandum responded to an inquiry from the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Civil Rights (OCR) on
whether AIDS is a handicap covered by section 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973.24 Section 504 prohibits discrimination against
handicapped individuals in programs conducted or funded by fed-
eral agencies. 25 A companion section of the Rehabilitation Act, sec-
tion 503,26 which is enforced by the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance Programs (OFCCP), requires covered government con-
tractors and subcontractors to take affirmative action to employ
qualified handicapped individuals. The following statutory defini-
tion of "handicapped individual" applies to both sections 504 and
503:27 "any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment
which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life
activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded
as having such an impairment." 2
8
22. 55 U.S.L.W. 4245 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1987).
23. Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Cooper on Application of Sec-
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to Persons with AIDS (June 23, 1986), reprinted in Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 122, at D-1 (June 25, 1986) [hereinafter Justice Department
Memorandum].
24. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982) [hereinafter § 504].
25. Section 504 provides in pertinent part:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States .. .shall,
solely by reason of his [or her] handicap, be excluded from the participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activ-
ity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.
26. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 503, 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1982) [hereinafter § 503].
27. It would seem, therefore, that the agencies enforcing §§ 503 and 504 would take
consistent approaches on whether AIDS is a handicap covered by this definition. An
interagency task force, comprising representatives from several government agencies
that have responsibility for enforcement of handicap discrimination laws, apparently has
been studying the issue. The OFCCP is currently investigating complaints of employ-
ment discrimination against AIDS victims, but has not yet rendered a final opinion on
the circumstances under which § 503 will be applied to AIDS victims. See Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 57, at A-4 (Mar. 25, 1986).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982). The OFCCP regulations set forth the same defini-
tions. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.2 app. A (1986). The regulations further define the mean-
ing of "physical or mental impairment" as:
(A) Any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurologi-
cal; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech or-
19871
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Applying this statutory definition, the Memorandum concluded
that, although the disabling effects of AIDS or AIDS Related Complex
(ARC) may be a "substantial limitation on major life activities," and
therefore a handicap,29 the ability to transmit the disease to others is not a
protected characteristic under section 504.30 Under this reasoning,
an employer could lawfully discriminate against persons with AIDS
or ARC if it did so out of fear of contagion (whether or not that fear
is rational) rather than because of the disabling aspects of the dis-
ease. Furthermore, individuals who test positive for antibodies to
the AIDS virus, but who are not afflicted by the disabling effects of
AIDS or ARC, would have no protection whatsoever against any dis-
crimination resulting from the seropositive response."'
This approach hinged on an analogy to disease carriers who are
immune to the disease but capable of transmitting it to others. The
Memorandum reasoned that, because these carriers are not afflicted
with disabling effects, and no physical or mental impairment inter-
feres with any major life function, the carriers are not handicapped
under the Rehabilitation Act.32 Thus, because "[c]ommunicability
alone is not a handicap.., it does not become a handicap.., simply
because it is accompanied by the disease's disabling effects." 33
From this distinction between AIDS' disabling effects and the ability
to transmit the disease, the Memorandum concluded that employers
may take discriminatory actions against AIDS victims if they fear the
gans; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary; hemic and
lymphatic; skin; and endocrine; or (B) any mental or psychological disorder,
such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental ill-
ness, and specific learning disabilities.
45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1986).
Many state legislatures and state fair employment agency regulations have adopted
similar definitions of "handicap" and "impairment."
29. Justice Department Memorandum, supra note 23, at D-7. The Memorandum
noted that AIDS creates an impairment that "substantially limits the major life activity of
resisting disabling and ultimately fatal diseases and may directly cause brain damage and
disorders." Id. Another substantial limitation posed by AIDS may be a physical weaken-
ing, and in such cases, the Memorandum concluded, "it would be a factual question
whether any particular stage of the illness satisfied the statutory requirement." Id. at D-7
n.63.
30. Id. at D-8 to D-9.
31. The Memorandum concluded that § 504 protects seropositive individuals only
against discrimination based on the perception that they are disabled, but not against
discrimination based on the perception that they are contagious. Id. at D-10. It further
notes that a physical condition, including seropositivity, does not become a handicap
"simply because it is a statistical predictor of some future disability or shortened life
span." Id. at D-9 n.73.
32. Id. at D-8.
33. Id. at D-9.
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AIDS victim is contagious," even if that fear is irrational.3 5
The Supreme Court's recent decision in School Board of Nassau
County, Florida v. Arline36 calls into question the analytical underpin-
nings of the Justice Department Memorandum. Gene Arline, an ele-
mentary school teacher, contracted the contagious disease
tuberculosis at the age of 14. Although she was in remission for
twenty years, Ms. Arline again tested positive for the disease in 1977
and on two later occasions. At the end of the 1978-79 school year,
the School Board voted to discharge Arline " 'not because she had
done anything wrong,' but because of the 'continued reoccurence
[sic] of the tuberculosis.' ,,17 The trial court held that although "she
suffers a handicap," nevertheless Ms. Arline was not a handicapped
person within the meaning and protections of the Rehabilitation
Act. In particular, the district court concluded that Congress never
intended contagious diseases to be included within the definition of
a handicap.3 8 The Eleventh Circuit reversed, ruling that diseases
are not excluded from coverage under section 504 simply because they
are contagious. 39
The Supreme Court affirmed. Writing for a seven-person ma-
jority,4" Justice Brennan first concluded that Ms. Arline had a "rec-
ord of an impairment" within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act,
because she had been hospitalized for tuberculosis soon after she
first contracted the disease in 19 5 7 .4 The Court then rejected the
school board's contention, also raised in the Justice Department's
amicus brief, that, although she had been impaired, Ms. Arline never-
theless was not "handicapped" within the meaning of section 504
because her discharge rested on her contagiousness rather than on
her diminished physical capabilities.42 Justice Brennan wrote:
We do not agree with petitioners that, in defining a handi-
34. Id. at D-1 1.
35. Id. at D-12.
36. 55 U.S.L.W. 4245 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1987).
37. Id. at 4246 (quoting record app. at 49-52).
38. Id.
39. 772 F.2d 759, 764 (1 th Cir. 1985). The circuit court found that Arline became
handicapped when she was afflicted with the disease because it "substantially limits ...
major life activities." Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982); 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.3(j)(2)(i)(A) (1985)). The court also concluded that Arline's remission periods
were protected under § 504 because she "has a record of such an impairment" and "is
regarded as having such an impairment" by the employer during these periods. Id.
(quoting 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(iii)-(iv) (1985)).
40. ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia dissented.
41. 55 U.S.L.W. at 4247.
42. Id. at 4247-48.
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capped individual under § 504, the contagious effects of a
disease can be meaningfully distinguished from the dis-
ease's physical effects on a claimant in a case such as this.
Arline's contagiousness and her physical impairment each
resulted from the same underlying condition, tuberculosis.
It would be unfair to allow an employer to seize upon the
distinction between the effects of a disease on others and
the effects of a disease on a patient and use that distinction
to justify discriminatory treatment. 43
Thus, Arline holds that a person who is both contagious and has
either an existing impairment or a record of impairment is handi-
capped within the meaning of section 504.4 4 Justice Brennan rea-
sons that, by extending coverage to those who are simply "regarded
as having" a physical or mental impairment, 45 Congress demon-
strated that it was "as concerned about the effect of an impairment
on others as it was about its effect on the individual. 46 The Court
concluded that Congress intended to protect persons with impair-
ments that "might not diminish a person's physical or mental capa-
bilities, but could nevertheless substantially limit that person's
ability to work as a result of the negative reactions of others to the im-
pairment. '47 Thus, "the effects of one's impairment on others is as
relevant to a determination of whether one is handicapped as is the
physical effect of one's handicap on oneself."'4 ' The Court particu-
larly noted that: "Congress acknowledged that society's accumu-
lated myths and fears about disability and disease are as
handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual
impairment. Few aspects of a handicap give rise to the same level of
public fear and misapprehension as contagiousness. '49
While some parts of the opinion merely echo the rather narrow
ruling of the Eleventh Circuit,50 much of the language could be
43. Id. (footnote omitted).
44. Consequently, a person who is not only seropositive but also has an "impair-
ment" or a "history of impairment" associated with AIDS should be protected as a
handicapped person within the meaning of § 504.
45. See 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B)(iii) (1982).
46. 55 U.S.L.W. at 4248.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 4248 n.10. The Court noted that, contrary to the Solicitor General's posi-
tion at oral argument, HHS regulations that identify "cosmetic disfigurement" as physi-
cal impairment support this conclusion. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i)(A) (1986).
49. 55 U.S.L.W. at 4248.
50. See id. at 4248-49 ("We conclude that the fact that a person with a record of a
physical impairment is also contagious does not suffice to remove that person from cov-
erage under § 504.").
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more broadly construed. The Court left no doubt that, at least
when an individual is suffering, has suffered, or is perceived to be
suffering from a physical or mental impairment-even one that does
not otherwise cause any "substantial limiting effect" on the individ-
ual's "major life activities"-the impairment is a protected handicap
if the individual is limited in major life activities by the "negative
reactions of others to its contagiousness.' '1 t
Under Arline, therefore, unlike the Justice Department Memo-
randum, an employer cannot avoid the coverage of the Rehabilita-
tion Act by simply contending that a disease's contagious nature,
rather than its disabling effect, precipitated an adverse employment
decision. In the context of the statutory definition of "handicapped
individual," if the individual has had, now has, or is regarded as hav-
ing an "impairment," it does not matter whether the "substantially
limiting effect" of the impairment on "major life activities" is caused
by its actual or perceived contagiousness as opposed to its actual or
perceived disabling effect. Thus, AIDS victims who are actually suf-
fering from the disease's effects cannot be discriminated against
solely on the basis that AIDS is contagious.
Of course, the only symptom shown by many who test positive
is the factor which causes seropositivity-i.e., the presence of the
AIDS antibody in the bloodstream.52 The Arline Court, however, ex-
plicitly reserved in a footnote the question raised by the Justice De-
partment Memorandum of whether a person who is merely
contagious, but who has no existing impairment or record of impair-
ment, is handicapped.5" Because Arline leaves open the issue of
whether a positive test result, by itself, would constitute an "impair-
ment" under section 504, future litigation is likely to focus on
whether contagiousness, without more, qualifies as an "impair-
ment." The Court's comment that it would be "unfair to allow an
employer to seize upon the distinction between the effects of a dis-
ease on others and the effects of a disease on a patient" to justify
51. Id. at 4248.
52. See supra note 2.
53. 55 U.S.L.W. at 4248 n.7 (referring specifically to AIDS and the Justice Depart-
ment's conclusion that contagiousness alone does not constitute a protected handicap).
If contagiousness alone is not an impairment, but merely a condition that substantially
limits a major life activity, seropositive individuals whose handicap discrimination claims
rest on proof of some physical or mental impairment associated with seropositivity
might be able to satisfy that burden by showing that they suffered some mental impair-
ment as a result of both the certain and the potential life changes that seropositivity
portends. Alternatively, claimants could satisfy the impairment requirement with medi-
cal evidence showing that seropositivity itself causes some physical disability.
1987] 293
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discriminatory treatment, 54 suggests that those contending that con-
tagiousness alone is not an "impairment" have the tougher side of
the argument.
So far only one federal court has confronted the specific issue
of whether AIDS is a handicap. In Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School
District 55 a federal district court in California granted a motion for a
preliminary injunction filed on behalf of a child with AIDS who was
prohibited from attending kindergarten after he bit a classmate.
The court held that AIDS is a protected handicap under section 504
and that there was not sufficient evidence to show that the child's
presence in the classroom created a risk that the disease would be
transmitted.
b. Is AIDS a Handicap ?. State Law. -Several states and localities
have declared discrimination against individuals with AIDS unlaw-
ful. Some city governments have enacted special ordinances to pro-
hibit discrimination based on AIDS.5 6 Most states and many local
jurisdictions already prohibit discrimination against handicapped in-
dividuals under statutes and ordinances patterned after the federal
Rehabilitation Act or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Ap-
54. 55 U.S.L.W. at 4247-48.
55. No. 886-609AHS (BY) (C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 1986), reported in Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 223, at A-I (Nov. 19, 1986).
56. A San Francisco ordinance, effective December 20, 1985, prohibits discrimina-
tion based on the fact that a person has or is perceived to have AIDS. This prohibition
extends to employment, housing, public accommodations, educational institutions, and
city facilities. San Francisco, Cal., Ordinance No. 49,985 (Dec. 20, 1985), reprinted in 3
Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) 20,950B (Dec. 1985).
On August 16, 1985, a Los Angeles public ordinance prohibiting employment dis-
crimination against persons perceived to have AIDS and persons with AIDS or AIDS-
related conditions became effective. Los ANGELES, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 4, art. 5.8
(1985). The Los Angeles City Attorney's Office, charged with enforcing the ordinance,
successfully mediated the first 45 complaints after the ordinance took effect. A deputy
city attorney noted that the " 'educational usefulness' of the ordinance has had a 'tre-
mendous effect on employers and citizens .... It has been a very useful social change
mechanism to let the community know that AIDS discrimination is inhuman and inap-
propriate, but also illegal.' " Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 48, at A-7 (Mar. 12, 1986).
Mayor W. Wilson Goode of Philadelphia issued an Executive Order on April 15,
1986, prohibiting discrimination against persons with AIDS for the purposes of employ-
ment and service. The order was based on new medical information that AIDS is not
communicable by casual contact and on a city solicitor's opinion that determined AIDS
to be a handicap. See Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 86, at A-4 (May 5, 1986).
On December 11, 1986, the City Council of Austin, Texas passed a broad ordinance
banning AIDS discrimination in employment, housing, and public accommodations.
The ordinance extends protection to persons with AIDS and ARC as well as to individu-
als who are seropositive or who are perceived to be at risk of contracting the disease. See
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 250, at A-3 (Dec. 31, 1986).
See also infra note 134 and accompanying text.
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proximately two-thirds of the state agencies that investigate claims
under these statutes have formally or informally stated that AIDS is
a protected handicap.57 Moreover, several state court and adminis-
trative agency decisions have held that AIDS is a handicap under
such statutes.58
57. The National Gay Rights Advocates (NGRA) recently conducted a survey of all
50 states and the District of Columbia to determine their positions on whether AIDS is a
handicap. The survey results were based on formal policies, case law, and informal re-
sponses from state agencies in charge of enforcing state handicap discrimination laws.
The survey reported that 33 states and the District of Columbia will accept AIDS-related
discrimination complaints or have already declared that their state statutes prohibit such
discrimination. See NATIONAL GAY RIGHTS Ass'N, AIDS AND HANDICAP DISCRIMINATION:
A SURVEY OF THE 50 STATES AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (1986), reported in 123 Lab.
Rel. Rep. (BNA) 96 (1986) (available from NGRA, 540 Castro St., San Francisco, CA
94114). In particular:
- The Washington, D.C. Office of Human Rights has determined AIDS to be a
physical handicap under the D.C. Human Rights Act of 1977. See IMPACT,July 16, 1986,
at 8.
- The Michigan Civil Rights Commission announced on August 25, 1986, that
AIDS is considered a handicap under Michigan's antidiscrimination law protecting the
handicapped. See 1 AIDS Policy & Law (BNA) No. 17, at 4 (Sept. 10, 1986).
- The Maine Human Rights Commission counsel testified on March 17, 1986,
that it is unlawful to discriminate against anyone with AIDS because AIDS is a protected
physical handicap under a Maine antibias law. See 2 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) 5023
(June 1986).
- On March 13, 1986, an opinion letter from the Oregon Bureau of Labor and
Industries stated that Oregon's Civil Rights Division has interpreted the statutory ban
on job discrimination against the physically and mentally handicapped to include AIDS.
See 2 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) 5020 (Oct. 1986).
- The New Jersey Division on Civil Rights has publicized its position that the
New Jersey law against handicap discrimination covers AIDS, unless the AIDS victim
would be unable to work without jeopardizing the health and safety of co-workers. See 2
Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) 5027 (July 1986).
- In January 1986 the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination stated
it has interpreted the state law barring handicap employment discrimination to prohibit
discrimination against persons with AIDS and persons who are perceived to be afflicted
with AIDS. See 2 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) 5024 (June 1986).
- New York's Division of Human Rights announced that AIDS is a disability
under the State Human Rights Act. The Division expressed its intent to accept com-
plaints from persons who claim they were discriminated against because they have AIDS,
are perceived to have AIDS, are in an identified high-risk group for susceptibility to
AIDS, are perceived to be susceptible to AIDS because of a relationship with a person
who has AIDS, or are identified as being susceptible to AIDS because they tested posi-
tive for the HTLV-III antibody. See 8A Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 455:3081 (Dec.
1985).
58. See, e.g., Department of Fair Employment & Hous. v. Raytheon Corp., No. 83-84-
LI-03101, L-33998 (Cal. Dep't of Fair Employment & Hous. Feb. 5, 1987), reprinted in
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at E-l, E-5 (Feb. 13, 1987) ("AIDS thus falls squarely
within the physical handicap coverage" of state fair employment and housing statute);
Cronan v. New Eng. Tel. Co., No. 80332 (Mass. Sup. Ct., Suffolk County Aug. 15, 1986),
reported and reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 179, at A-4, D-1 (Sept. 16, 1986); State
of New York v. 49 West 12 Tenants Corp., No. 43604/1983 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984); Shut-
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Shuttleworth v. Broward County Office of Budget and Management Pol-
icy59 was the first decision under a state antidiscrimination statute
holding that AIDS is a handicap. Lacking a statutory definition of
"handicap," 60 the Florida Commission on Human Relations relied
on the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Arline and on
the definition of "handicap" in Webster's Third International Dic-
tionary to conclude that, based on the medical evidence presented,
an AIDS victim "does not enjoy, in some manner, the full and nor-
mal use of his sensory, mental or physical faculties."-61 The em-
ployer's major concern in Shuttleworth appeared to be the higher risk
posed by AIDS victims to persons whose immune systems are de-
pressed by various drugs or illnesses. The Commission concluded,
however, that this risk exists only when AIDS victims have "easily
transmittable opportunistic diseases. '"62
In Cronan v. New England Telephone Co.63 a Massachusetts supe-
tleworth v. Broward County Office of Management and Budget, No. 85-0624 (Fla.
Comm'n on Human Relations Dec. 11, 1985), reprinted in 2 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH)
5014 (Feb. 1986); Racine Educ. Ass'n v. Racine Unified School Dist., No. 8650279
(Wis. Dep't of Indus., Lab. & Human Relations, Equal Rights Div. April 30, 1986), re-
printed in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 98, at E-I (May 21, 1986).
Several other complaints are pending before various state courts and administrative
agencies. See, e.g., Doe v. Sinacola & Sons Excavating, Inc., No. 86-320825NZ (Cal. Cir.
Ct., Oakland County filed Oct. 9, 1986), reported in 1 AIDS Policy & Law (BNA) No. 23, at
2 (Dec. 3, 1986) (former employee filed a $10 million lawsuit charging employer with
violating state law prohibiting discrimination against person with AIDS, and alleging
breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress); Leckelt v. Board of
Comm'rs of Hosp. Dist. No. 1, No. 86-4235 (Dist. Ct. La., Sec. K, Div. 1, filed Sept. 29,
1986), reported in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 195, at A-5 (Oct. 8, 1986) (nurse alleges
AIDS discrimination under state handicap laws and § 504 because he was transferred
and subsequently fired after his roommate was admitted to the hospital for treatment of
AIDS and he repeatedly refused the hospital's request to take an AIDS test-nurse
charges that the hospital discriminated against him on the basis of a perceived fear that
he was contagious due to his exposure to an AIDS victim. This suit may be the first to
challenge theJune 23, 1986,Justice Department opinion that AIDS discrimination is not
illegal under § 504 if the employer's actions are based on a fear of contagion); Goodfel-
low v. Quinn Patent Drawing Serv., Inc., Chancery No. 16662 (Va. Cir. Ct. filed Feb. 13,
1986), reported in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at A-6 (Feb. 14, 1986) (employee alleges
he was fired after he was diagnosed as having AIDS).
59. No. 85-0624 (Fla. Comm'n on Human Relations Dec. 11, 1985), reprinted in 2
Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) 5014 (Feb. 1986).
60. See FL4. STAT. §§ 760.01 - 760.10 (1983).
61. Shuttleworth, 2 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) at 5014.
62. Id. (emphasis in original). The employer offered no evidence to show that Shut-
tleworth suffered from any opportunistic disease. After the state agency ruling, Shut-
tleworth filed a federal discrimination claim against his employer in federal court. That
claim settled on December 5, 1986, and the employer agreed to rehire Shuttleworth and
to pay him $196,000. See White Collar Rep. (BNA) No. 60, at 565 (Dec. 10, 1986).
63. No. 80332 (Mass. Sup. Ct., Suffolk County, Aug. 15, 1986), reprinted in Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 179, at D-I (Sept. 16, 1986).
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rior court relied on Shuttleworth, the Justice Department Memoran-
dum, the AIDS policy of the Massachusetts Commission Against
Discrimination, and the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Arline, each of
which it read as concluding on varying grounds that some aspects of
AIDS or similar contagious diseases are handicaps. 64 Without indi-
cating which, if any, of the opinions it was following or what its final
decision would be, the court concluded that Cronan's allegation that
he was handicapped by AIDS was sufficient to withstand a motion to
dismiss .65
So far, none of the state decisions has followed the Justice De-
partment Memorandum in distinguishing between the contagious
nature of AIDS and its disabling effects, and, although not binding
on them, the Supreme Court's Arline opinion now can be expected
to serve as a guidepost for state courts and administrative agencies
dealing with AIDS issues in the future.
c. Is An AIDS Victim "Qualified?"--If AIDS is a handicap, the
next issue is whether AIDS victims nevertheless are qualified for the
jobs they seek. To be protected either by section 503 or 504 of the
federal Rehabilitation Act or by most state antidiscrimination laws,
an individual must be "qualified" or "otherwise qualified."' 66 Under
both HHS and OFCCP regulations, however, before excluding a
handicapped applicant as not "qualified" an employer first must de-
termine whether "reasonable accommodations" could be made to
remove the impediment posed by the handicap. 67 Further, under
these agencies' regulations, job requirements can exclude handi-
capped individuals on the basis of their disability only if the job re-
quirement is directly relevant to the work or is a business
68necessity.
In Arline the Supreme Court made it plain that the danger that
64. Id. at D-3.
65. Id. This case was recently settled and, under the terms of the settlement agree-
ment, Cronan will be allowed to return to work. See Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 204, at
A-2 (Oct. 22, 1986).
66. Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act protects "qualified handicapped individu-
als," 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1982), while § 504 protects "otherwise qualified handicapped in-
dividual[s]," id. at § 794. The HHS and OFCCP regulations under these sections
interpret these terms synonymously. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.2 (1986) (defining "quali-
fied handicapped individual"); 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k) (1986) (same). An "individualized
inquiry" is required to determine whether a handicapped individual is qualified or
otherwise qualified. School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 55 U.S.L.W. 4245,
4249 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1987).
67. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(b)-(d) (1986); 45 C.F.R. § 84.12 (1986). See also Arline,
55 U.S.L.W. at 4249 & n. 17.
68. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.5(c) (1986); 45 C.F.R. § 84.13 (1986).
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handicapped individuals pose to the health and safety of their co-
workers or the general public clearly may be a consideration in de-
termining whether those individuals are qualified: "A person who
poses a significant risk of communicating an infectious disease to
others in the workplace will not be otherwise qualified for his or her
job if reasonable accommodation will not eliminate that risk." 69
The Court adopted a suggestion from the American Medical Associ-
ation's amicus brief that the following facts, " 'based on reasonable
medical judgments given the state of medical knowledge,'" should
be considered in determining whether the contagious nature of a
handicap disqualifies an individual from his or her job: " '(a) the
nature of the risk (how the disease is transmitted), (b) the duration
of the risk (how long is the carrier infectious), (c) the severity of the
risk (what is the potential harm to third parties), and (d) the
probabilities the disease will be transmitted and will cause varying
degrees of harm.' "" Not included among these factors was a sug-
gestion in the Justice Department Memorandum that, in assessing
health and safety dangers, an employer may consider the extent to
which a normal person would willingly risk exposure to the AIDS
virus. The Memorandum had reasoned that, in the case of an incur-
able, painful, and fatal disease about which medical knowledge is in
the early stages of development, most people would avoid exposure
to even the slightest risk of infection.
The Arline opinion did not specifically address the burden of
proof on the employer who wishes to exclude a handicapped indi-
vidual from a job due to the contagiousness of his or her condition,
except to state that "courts ordinarily should defer to the reason-
able medical judgment of public health officials," on the safety risks
posed by a particular contagious disease,7 ' thereby signaling its
probable willingness to accept the recommendations of the Centers
for Disease Control on this subject with regard to AIDS.7 2
69. Arline, 55 U.S.L.W. at 4249 n.16. See also Smith v. Administrator of Veterans
Affairs, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 986 (C.D. Cal. 1983); Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
v. State Div. of Human Rights, 63 A.D.2d 170,406 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1978), aff'd, 49 N.Y.2d
234, 401 N.E.2d 196, 425 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1980); In re Unlawful Employment Practices
Based Upon a Physical Handicap by Montgomery Ward & Co., 280 Or. 163, 570 P.2d 76
(1977). Increased costs of health benefits for handicapped workers are not a sufficient
job-related reason for denying employment, however. See, e.g., State Div. of Human
Rights v. Xerox Corp., 65 N.Y.2d 213, 218,480 N.E.2d 695, 697, 491 N.Y.S.2d 106, 108
(1985).
70. Arline, 55 U.S.L.W. at 4249 (quoting Brief for American Medical Association as
amicus curiae at 19); Justice Department Memorandum, supra note 23, at D-12 to D-13.
71. Arline, 55 U.S.L.W. at 4249.
72. See CDC, RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 5.
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Most courts have held that an employer who wishes to exclude
from employment a handicapped individual who can presently do
the job at issue has the burden of proving that employment of the
person would create a probability that the person would suffer fur-
ther severe harm (or cause harm to others) within the reasonably
foreseeable future.73 Under this standard, an employee who merely
tests positive for the AIDS antibody may not present enough of a
future risk to justify denial of employment. Based on current medi-
cal knowledge, there exists only a twenty percent chance of develop-
ing AIDS once infection occurs.7 4 This percentage, although
alarming, would probably not justify exclusion of employees or job
applicants who merely test positive for infection.
An individual with a fully developed case of AIDS, however,
poses a different problem. A court would be forced to decide
whether there was any risk in allowing the AIDS sufferer to continue
working with others. If the AIDS employee is at risk of contracting a
communicable opportunistic disease that accompanies AIDS, the
employer might contend that the employee is a present risk to those
co-workers who are immuno-suppressant. The courts, however, still
may find that an employer could reasonably accommodate this
worker by isolation from others.
d. The Duty To Accommodate.-The duty to accommodate will
become an issue in any AIDS handicap discrimination case. Even
under section 504, which does not specifically contain an accommo-
dation requirement, the Supreme Court has indicated that the fail-
ure to accommodate nevertheless may violate that section. In
Southeastern Community College v. Davis75 the Court noted that "situa-
tions may arise where a refusal to modify an [employer's] existing
program might become unreasonable and discriminatory. Identifica-
tion of those instances where a refusal to accommodate the needs of
a disabled person amounts to discrimination against the handi-
capped continues to be an important responsibility of [HHS]. ' 7 6
The Department of Health and Human Services has imposed in its
regulations a duty to make reasonable accommodations for the
handicapped, 77 as have most state fair employment agencies. Ap-
73. See Maine Human Rights Comm'n v. Canadian Pacific, Ltd., 458 A.2d 1225, 1234
(Me. 1983); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Bowen, 60 Md. App. 299, 309, 482 A.2d 921, 926
(1984).
74. See Osborn, supra note 11, at 50.
75. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
76. Id. at 412-13. See also Arline, 55 U.S.L.W. at 4249.
77. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.12 (1986). In addition, although § 503 does not specifically
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propriate accommodations might include a leave of absence, light
duty work if available, or changes in the work schedule. 78 Arline spe-
cially noted that "although [employers] are not required to find an-
other job for an employee who is not qualified for the job he or she
was doing, they cannot deny an employee alternative employment
opportunities reasonably available under the employer's existing
policies." 7
9
2. Are AIDS Victims Members of Any Other Protected Class?-a. Pro-
tected Classes Under Title VII and its State Counterparts.-Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for employers to discrimi-
nate against individuals on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin."8 In Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 8 the Supreme Court
recognized that Title VII prohibits not only overt discrimination,
but also "practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in opera-
tion.'"82 It is not necessary to show discriminatory motivation be-
cause the Act is directed to correct "the consequences of employment
practices, not simply the motivation."83 Many state and local an-
tidiscrimination agencies have adopted this "adverse impact" theory
of liability for discrimination and have applied it in the context of
laws that discriminate on the basis of characteristics other than
those listed in Title VII.84 For example, in several states, sexual
preference or sexual orientation is a protected characteristic.85
require accommodation, one could argue that, by imposing on employers the duty to
take affirmative action, it implicitly requires accommodation.
78. Reasonable accommodations are required so long as they do not result in an
"undue hardship" on the business. Id. It is unclear whether the duty to accommodate
the handicapped will be interpreted as broader than the duty imposed by Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 to accommodate religious needs. Cf Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v.
Philbrook, 107 S. Ct. 367, 372 (1986) (holding that, under Title VII's duty to accommo-
date an employee's religious beliefs, an employer who offers a reasonable accommoda-
tion to an employee is not required to accede to the employee's preference for an
alternate accommodation); Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 82 (1977)
(reasonable accommodation does not require that employer deny some employees their
shift and job preference in order to accommodate religious needs of other employees).
79. Arline, 55 U.S.L.W. at 4249 n.9.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
81. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
82. Id. at 431.
83. Id. at 432 (emphasis in original).
84. See, e.g., Brunback v. Jensen, No. H76-7 (Md. Comm'n on Human Relations
1984) (applying MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 14 (1986), which in addition to the Title VII
protections, protects age, marital status, and physical and mental handicaps).
85. The following states have issued executive orders prohibiting discrimination by
state government agencies based on sexual orientation: California (Exec. Order No. B-
54-79, April 4, 1979) (summarized in 8A Fair Empl. Prac. Man.-State Laws (BNA)
453:853 (Sept. 1983)); New York (Exec. Order No. 28, Nov. 18, 1983) (summarized in
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About seventy-four percent of AIDS victims have been homo-
sexual or bisexual men. 6 Using Griggs' adverse impact theory, ho-
mosexual and bisexual AIDS victims no doubt could argue that
policies limiting their employment rights have anadverse impact on
them, and therefore violate state or local laws that make sexual pref-
erence a protected characteristic.8 7 In Wisconsin, for example,
where the state's fair employment law prohibits discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation,88 the Wisconsin Department of In-
dustry, Labor and Human Relations has held that "given the fact
that 73% of those with AIDS are sexually active homosexual and bi-
sexual men, the respondent's policy [excluding AIDS victims from
working in a school setting] has a disparate impact on that group of
people because of their sexual orientation."89 This argument, how-
ever, would probably fail under Title VII because the courts have
declined any opportunity to expand judicially Title VII's prohibition
on "sex" discrimination to include sexual preference.9 °
Similarly, it might also be possible for an individual of Haitian
or African descent discriminated against because of actual or sus-
pected AIDS infection to assert a violation of Title VII based on
8A Fair Empl. Prac. Man.-State Laws (BNA) 455:3072 (Mar. 1985)); and Pennsylvania
(Exec. Order No. 1975-5, Sept. 19, 1978), reprinted in 8A Fair Empl. Prac. Man.-State
Laws (BNA) 457:831 (July 1979). At least two states have included the prohibition
against sexual orientation discrimination in their fair employment policies and, as a re-
sult, the prohibition is not limited to government employers: District of Columbia
(Human Rights Act of 1977, title 1, ch. 25, codified at D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2512 (1981),
reprinted in 8A Fair Empl. Prac. Man.-State Laws (BNA) 453:1605 (June 1985)); Wiscon-
sin (Fair Employment Act, title 13, ch. 11, codifiedat Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.36 (l)(d)(l)
(West Supp. 1986), reprinted in 8A Fair Empl. Prac. Man.-State Laws (BNA) 457:3210
(Sept. 1985)).
86. See supra note 6.
87. Of course, as AIDS spreads to the heterosexual community, policies that have an
adverse impact on AIDS victims will not necessarily discriminate on the basis of sexual
preference.
88. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.31 (West 1974 & Supp. 1986).
89. Racine Educ. Ass'n v. Racine Unified School Dist., No. 8650279 (Wis. Dep't of
Indus., Lab. & Human Relations, Equal Rights Div. April 30, 1986), reprinted in Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 98, at E-1 (May 21, 1986).
90. See DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30 (9th Cir. 1979)
("Title VII's prohibition of 'sex' discrimination applies only to discrimination on the
basis of gender."); Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979) ("Dis-
charge for homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII or Section 1981."). In contrast,
some courts have held that heterosexual persons may sue under Title VII for homosex-
ual or lesbian harassment. See, e.g.,Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537, 541
(M.D. Ala. 1983) (male employee was solicited by a homosexual manager; court found
that "unwelcomed homosexual harassment also states a violation of Title VII") (emphasis
in original), aff'd, 749 F.2d 732 (11 th Cir. 1984); Wright v. Methodist Youth Servs., Inc.,
511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (same conclusion).
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national origin. Previously, Haitians were thought to be at high risk
of contracting AIDS. Although the risk is no longer associated with
this group,9' a Haitian might assert adverse impact under Title VII
because the publicity surrounding the group still lingers. Similarly,
because the media currently is reporting the widespread AIDS epi-
demic in African nations,9 2 persons of African descent may be enti-
tled to protection if employers discriminate against them because of
the link between AIDS and their national origin.
b. Protection Under the Equal Protection Clause.-The equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment commands that no state
shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws," 93 or, in other words, that similarly situated persons
should be treated in a similar fashion. 94 When state action 95 estab-
lishes a class of people who are treated differently from others, for
example by adopting a personnel regulation requiring that AIDS
victims be denied certain kinds of jobs, it is appropriate to inquire
whether the classification denies equal protection of the laws.
For most types of state action, the courts look only to see
whether the established classification "bears some fair relationship
to a legitimate public purpose." 96 This "rational relationship" stan-
dard, however, does not apply to all classifications. Over the years,
several "suspect" and "quasi-suspect" classifications have devel-
91. The Centers for Disease Control removed Haitians from the list of the AIDS
high-risk groups. The involvement of Haitians in the epidemic is explained by one com-
mentator in this way:
Haiti is apparently a favorite vacation spot for many homosexual men, and an-
tibody screening among individuals in Haiti has revealed that whereas the gen-
eral population is not notably antibody positive, the Carrefour district of Port-
au-Prince-said to be the most concentrated locale of both male and female
prostitutes-has a relatively high representation of antibody-positive
individuals.
Osborn, supra note 11, at 50.
92. It is reported that AIDS is endemic to the African countries of Zaire, Burundi,
Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Kenya. See Langone, supra note 15, at 31.
93. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. The same equal protection analysis of the four-
teenth amendment that is applied to the states is also applied to the federal government
through the due process language of the fifth amendment. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497 (1954).
94. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216, reh'g dnied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982).
95. The prohibition extends to any type of "state action," which includes the acts not
only of state and local governments and their agents and instrumentalities but also of
private employers that are sufficiently involved with the government. See Burton v. Wil-
mington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) ("private conduct abridging individual
rights does no violence to the Equal Protection Clause unless to some significant extent
the State in any of its manifestations has been found to be involved in it").
96. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216.
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oped and state action that affects these groups must satisfy a stricter
scrutiny.
Specifically, race and alienage are suspect classifications97 and,
as such, state action discriminating against these groups will be sus-
tained only if it is reasonably tailored to serve a compelling state inter-
est. 98 Several quasi-suspect classifications have been subjected to an
intermediate level of scrutiny. Thus, for classifications based on
gender and illegitimacy, the test sometimes applied is whether the
classification is substantially related to an important governmental objec-
tive.9 9 In contrast, other classifications have not been subjected to
the heightened scrutiny of a suspect or quasi-suspect class. These
groups include age'00 and wealth' 0 ' groups and handicapped per-
sons. 10 2 State action discriminating on the basis of these group
characteristics must merely be rationally related to a legitimate gov-
ernment purpose.
As discussed in the previous section on Title VII, most courts
distinguish discrimination based on sexual preference or orientation
from discrimination based on sex or gender.' 0 3 Because AIDS af-
flicts primarily those with a certain sexual preference, courts are not
likely to apply the sex/gender intermediate level of constitutional
scrutiny to a classification of AIDS victims. Similarly, because the
Supreme Court has held that legislation discriminating against the
97. See generally McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (central policy be-
hind the fourteenth amendment to eliminate official discrimination based on race ren-
ders racial classifications constitutionally suspect); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,
376 (1971) (alienage classifications are suspect).
98. See, e.g., Britton v. Rogers, 631 F.2d 572 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 939
(1981).
99. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-26 (1982) (gender
classifications are "quasi-suspect"); United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23 (1980) (illegiti-
macy classifications are "quasi-suspect").
100. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
101. Black v. Sullivan, 561 F. Supp. 1050 (D. Me. 1983).
102. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3255 (1985).
The Cleburne Court declined to hold that retarded individuals constitute either a suspect
or a quasi-suspect class, explaining that
it would be difficult to find a principled way to distinguish a variety of other
groups who have perhaps immutable disabilities setting them off from others,
who cannot themselves mandate the desired legislative responses, and who can
claim some degree of prejudice from at least part of the public at large. One
need mention in this respect only the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and
the infirm. We are reluctant to set out on that course, and we decline to do so.
Id. at 3257-58 (emphasis added).
As a result, legislation affecting retarded individuals was not subject to heightened
scrutiny.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 80-92.
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handicapped will not be subjected to heightened scrutiny, it appears
that AIDS victims would not be a suspect or quasi-suspect class
under this theory. Accordingly, legislation classifying individuals
based on their affliction or degree of affiliation with AIDS (e.g., test-
ing positive for the AIDS antibody) most likely would be subject
only to scrutiny under the rational relationship standard.
B. What Is the Extent of the AIDS Victim's Right of Privacy?
A major concern of both AIDS victims and employers is the ex-
tent to which employers have the right to inquire about or test an
employee or job applicant for AIDS. Closely connected is the ques-
tion of what employers can and cannot legally do with any informa-
tion derived from such inquiries or tests. Statutory, common, and
constitutional laws apply.
1. Screening Issues.-AIDS testing may violate not only employ-
ees' statutory rights, but also their common-law rights to privacy
and, in the public sector, their constitutional rights to privacy and to
be free from unreasonable search and seizure under the fourth
amendment.
a. Legislative Restrictions on AIDS Screening.-To assure privacy
for AIDS victims, some states and localities have enacted legislation
banning AIDS testing or limiting the use of testing results in the
employment context.' 0 4 Even without specific legislation, employ-
ers may be prohibited from using the results of such tests for em-
ployment decisions in jurisdictions in which AIDS is a protected
104. For example:
- A California law, effective January 1, 1986, bans the use of test results for the AIDS
virus "for the determination of insurability or suitability for employment." 1985 Cal.
Legis. Serv. 22 (West), reported in 4 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 14:210(h) (Sept. 29, 1986).
- The Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination stated in January 1986 that
preemployment inquiries concerning AIDS are prohibited. Reported in 2 Empl. Prac.
Guide (CCH) 5025 (Jan. 1986).
- The New Jersey Division on Civil Rights announced that state law prohibits an em-
ployer from conditioning employment on taking an AIDS test, unless the employer can
show that an employee who tests positive could not perform the job in question without
jeopardizing the health and safety of the employee or others. Reported in 2 Empl. Prac.
Guide (CCH) 5027 (July 1986).
- The Mayor of Philadelphia, W. Wilson Goode, issued an executive order prohibiting
the screening of city employees or clients for AIDS. Reported in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 86, at A-4 (May 5, 1986).
- Section 3809 of San Francisco Ordinance No. 49985 prohibits testing designed to
show that a person has AIDS or any AIDS-associated condition unless the employer
"can show that absence of AIDS is a bona fide occupational qualification." Reprinted in 3
Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) 20,950B (Dec. 1985).
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handicap. Under most handicap discrimination statutes, employers
may consider AIDS test results in employment decisions only if they
can show a link between test results and job qualifications. In other
words, unless the employer could prove that persons testing posi-
tive for AIDS antibodies are not "otherwise qualified" for the job,
the use of test results as an exclusionary standard would be prohib-
ited.' °5 Because the present AIDS screening tests determine only
the presence of the antibodies, however, and not necessarily the
presence of contagious virus or any degree of disability, many indi-
viduals who test positive could still perform their jobs.
b. Common-Law Privacy Restrictions.-In addition to statutory re-
strictions on the right to screen for AIDS, most states recognize a
common-law right to personal privacy, so that the unreasonable in-
trusion into another person's seclusion or private affairs supports a
claim for compensatory and punitive damages. In the employment
context, such suits involve the employer's accumulation of "private"
information both through searches of employees' lockers or other
personal belongings and through various tests or requests for medi-
cal information.10 6
An actionable intrusion might occur if an employer performed
an AIDS test without the employee's knowledge or consent. The
intrusion "must be something which would be offensive or objec-
105. See, e.g., supra note 104; 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(c)(2)-(3) (1986); 45 C.F.R. § 84.14
(1986). Some states also generally prohibit both preemployment medical questions that
are not job-related in a timely and material way and preemployment medical exams that
are not designed to establish ability to do the job. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 100,
§ 95A (1985). Although Arline did not specifically address the AIDS testing issue, its
determination that "courts ordinarily should defer to the reasonable medical judgment
of public health officials" suggests that employers and courts should defer to the Cen-
ters for Disease Control's recommendation that AIDS testing generally is not necessary
in the workplace. See CDC, RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 5.
106. See, e.g., Valencia v. Duval Corp., 132 Ariz. 348, 645 P.2d 1262 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1982) (conduct of company personnel supervisor and company-designated physician,
who telephoned employee's physician to obtain medical information, was not sufficiently
"extreme and outrageous" conduct so as to entitle employee to prevail on invasion of
privacy claim); K-Mart Corp. Store No. 7441 v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Ct. App.
1984) (holding that it was an invasion of privacy to search employee's locker when em-
ployee and not employer maintained key to locker). An employer may also create a
contractual right of privacy for its employees by virtue of policy statements or employee
handbook provisions guaranteeing employees that the employer will not inquire into
certain aspects of their private lives, or that certain information about them will be kept
confidential. See, e.g., Rulon-Miller v. I.B.M., 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524
(1984) (employer held liable to employee for intentional infliction of emotional distress
and breach of employment contract when it terminated her for dating competitor's em-




tionable to a reasonable person. "107 To many people, the use with-
out consent of a blood sample for the ELISA or Western Blot test
for AIDS would be unexpected and objectionable. A positive result
could provoke adverse employment actions by prospective employ-
ers and lead to unfavorable inferences about how the employee was
exposed to the disease. Thus, an invasion of privacy claim probably
could be made.
As with other torts, consent to the intrusion is a defense.' 0 8
Moreover, in deciding whether to impose liability, courts generally
balance the employer's need to know the accumulated information
against the employee's reasonable expectation of privacy.' 0 9 Em-
ployers might contend that they have a reasonable need to know
whether the cause of an employee's or applicant's discernible symp-
toms, such as weakness or susceptibility to certain diseases, is due to
AIDS or ARC because, as discussed previously," 0 a reasonable
probability that the employee would be unable to perform the job
within the reasonably foreseeable future might justify an adverse
employment decision.
A bizarre lawsuit recently filed against an airline might at first
glance spur some employers to test for AIDS in some jobs. In Jane
Doe v. American Airlines"' 1 a passenger filed a $12 million lawsuit
against the airline after one of its employees allegedly bit her. The
employee subsequently tested positive for the AIDS antibody. The
suit's legal theories include a claim that the airline was negligent in
hiring the employee because it knew or should have known of the
employee's violent personality and exposure to the AIDS virus.
Although the suit certainly raises the specter of exorbitant monetary
claims for negligent hiring against employers who knew or reason-
ably should have known their employees were both infected with
AIDS and likely to spread it within the context of their employ-
ment, 112 current medical knowledge suggests that such claims might
107. W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 855 (5th ed. 1984).
108. See id. at 867.
109. See, e.g., Simmons v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 452 F. Supp. 392, 394 (W.D.
Okla. 1978), aff'd, 611 F.2d 342 (10th Cir. 1979) (employee had no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in personal telephone calls made from telephone he knew would be
monitored at all times); Thomas v. Gen. Elec. Co., 207 F. Supp. 792, 799 (W.D. Ky.
1962) (employer did not unreasonably invade the privacy of employees by taking photo-
graphs of them during the performance of their duties because employer had reasonable
need for the photographs as part of a work efficiency study).
110. See supra text accompanying note 73.
111. No. 86 L 19638 (Cook County Cir. Ct. filed Sept. 2, 1986), reported in Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 173, at A-5 (Sept. 8, 1986).
112. Negligent hiring or retention claims have been recognized in several jurisdic-
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be successfully and more easily defended with evidence that the em-
ployer investigated applicants for violent tendencies than with evi-
dence that it tested them for the AIDS antibody.
c. Constitutional Restrictions.-Medical tests, including tests for
AIDS, might also run afoul of public sector employees' constitu-
tional rights to privacy and to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures."13 Again, reasonable need to know or "probable
cause" to believe an unsafe condition exists might justify testing." 4
Given the current position of the medical community that AIDS is
not transmittable by casual workplace conduct but only by conduct
of an intimate nature, however, employers may find it hard to estab-
lish that they need to know whether an employee or applicant tests
positive to the AIDS antibody. This is particularly true in view of
the fact that a positive test for the antibody does not necessarily es-
tablish that the employee's body harbors the AIDS virus at that
time.' 15
Nevertheless, at least two federal agencies have begun AIDS
testing programs for employees and applicants. The State Depart-
ment has announced plans to test foreign service applicants, em-
ployees, and their dependents for exposure to the AIDS virus. The
State Department says its mandatory screening order is necessary
because overseas medical care could prove to be inadequate to han-
dle the health needs of a seropositive individual. Moreover, persons
traveling overseas often require vaccinations before traveling to cer-
tain areas, and adult seropositive individuals should, in principle,
avoid any vaccination. Finally, the State Department depends upon
the overseas local American community to provide blood for trans-
fusions in countries that do not test their own blood donations for
the AIDS antibodies. Initial screening by the State Department will
tions. See, e.g., Henley v. Prince George's County, 305 Md. 320, 336, 503 A.2d 1333,
1341 (1986) (recognizing negligent hiring claim by relatives of murder victim who was
killed by ex-convict working as security guard).
113. See, e.g., Capua v. City of Plainsfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1513 (D.NJ. 1986);
McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1127 (S.D. Iowa 1985); Turner v. Fraternal
Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005, 1009 (D.C. 1985); City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So.
2d 1322, 1325-26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Caruso v. Ward, 506 N.Y.S.2d 789, 799
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (striking down a proposed policy to conduct random drug testing
on police employees because the random standardless testing could not meet the rea-
sonableness requirements under the fourth amendment).
114. Cf. Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986) (New Jersey Racing
Commission rules requiring jockeys to submit to breathalyzers and post-race urine tests
do not violate their constitutional rights because unique nature of racing profession jus-
tifies the need for random drug testing).
115. See supra note 2.
1987]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
ensure that potential donors have not been exposed to the
antibody." 16
The Department of Labor also has announced plans to conduct
AIDS tests on Job Corps applicants and current trainees. The de-
partment justified the proposed testing based on its responsibility
for the health and safety of Corps members who live and work in
residential Job Corps centers. A spokesperson explained that the
Labor Department is "responsible for Corps members 24 hours a
day, seven days a week." Because these are coed centers, the de-





2. Disclosure Problems.-Once an employer learns, whether
through AIDS testing or a voluntary disclosure, that an employee or
applicant has AIDS or is seropositive, the employer must handle this
information with extreme caution. Potential liability exists for defa-
mation, invasion of privacy, and intentional or negligent infliction of
emotional distress. Nevertheless, the employer may also be liable to
infected employees or job applicants if it does not disclose positive
test results to the infected individual." 18
116. Reported in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 231, at A-9 (Dec. 2, 1986). This policy has
been challenged by a government employees' union, which has filed suit against the
State Department's AIDS testing on the grounds that such testing violates employees'
privacy rights guaranteed under the first, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments. Local
1812, Am. Fed. of Gov't Employees v. United States Dep't of State, No. 87-0121 (D.D.C.
1987), reported in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at A-20 (Jan. 21, 1987). As a result of
Arline, claims also can be expected under the Rehabilitation Act.
117. Reported in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 244, at A-2 (Dec. 19, 1986). Opponents
promise to challenge this testing policy in court. Rep. Ted Weiss, Chairman of the
House Government Operations Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations and
Human Resources, says that AIDS testing is "one thing for the military, another for the
Foreign Service, and quite another for [the Job Corps], where there is absolutely no
medical justification and [AIDS testing is] totally contrary to the PHS guidelines." Re-
ported in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 244, at A-3 (Dec. 19, 1986). Weiss has requested the
Secretary of Labor, William Brock, to explain the program's necessity in light of PHS
guidelines recommending against AIDS testing in schools and employment. In addi-
tion, the legislative counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union, Barry Lynn, has
stated that the Job Corps testing "creates very serious policy issues that are certain to be
litigated." Id.
118. In some cases, employers have been held liable for not alerting employees to
medical problems discovered through routine preemployment or employment physicals.
See, e.g., Dornak v. Lafayette Gen. Hosp., 399 So. 2d 168 (La. 1981) (hospital employer
that gave preemployment physical which revealed tuberculosis had duty to disclose con-
dition to tested employee). Query whether the failure to disclose a contagious condition
to the employee would make the employer liable to a third party whom the tested em-
ployee unknowingly exposed? Cf. Wojcik v. Aluminum Co. of America, 18 Misc. 2d 740,
183 N.Y.S.2d 351 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959) (wife who caught tuberculosis from husband had
cause of action against his employer who, she claimed, knew of condition and failed to
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a. Defamation.-Defamation is defined as "that which tends to
injure 'reputation' in the popular sense; to diminish the esteem, re-
spect, goodwill or confidence in which the plaintiff is held, or to ex-
cite adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions against
him." 19 Generally, if an employer discloses that an employee
tested positive for the AIDS antibody, the employee may have a def-
amation claim based on one or all of three possible inferences. The
employee may assert a defamation claim on the grounds that the
reference to AIDS implies that the employee is either a homosexual
person 20 or an intravenous drug user. Alternatively, the employee
might contend that because AIDS can be considered a venereal dis-
ease, 12 the employer has imputed that the employee has a "loath-
some disease."'
12 2
Consent, truth, and privilege are defenses that the employer
may use to defeat a defamation claim.' 23 In most states, communi-
cations regarding an employee by a former to a prospective em-
ployer may be conditionally privileged. 124  Distribution of the
defamatory material outside the "qualified privileged circle" of peo-
ple who need the information destroys the privilege.'
25
b. Invasion of Privacy.-In addition to liability for defamation
and emotional distress, an employer who discloses that an employee
has AIDS or is seropositive may be liable under a second theory of
disclose it to her or her husband). It is possible that putting in the exam consent form a
disclaimer of any duty to disclose would absolve the employer of this duty. Neverthe-
less, employers may be required to release such test results under OSHA "Access Stan-
dard" regulations. See infra text accompanying notes 171-73.
119. W. KEETON, supra note 107, at 773.
120. Cf. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, 383 U.S. 53, 65 n.7 (1966)
(defamation includes accusing a person of having engaged in homosexual conduct);
Buck v. Savage, 323 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) (saying that one person is
"queer" on another is "slanderous per se because [it] impute[s] to appellee the commis-
sion of the crime of sodomy . . .").
121. AIDS, transmitted through sexual activity, could be classified as a venereal dis-
ease. See 4 SCHMIDT'S ATTORNEY'S DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE V-50 (1986) ("venereal"
defined as "pertaining to, or involving, sexual intercourse").
122. For a historical review of why a statement that one has venereal disease is consid-
ered slander actionable without proof of damages, see W. KEETON, Supra note 107, at
788-90.
123. Id. at 823-39.
124. See, e.g., Sindorf v. Jacron Sales Co., 27 Md. App. 53, 68, 341 A.2d 856, 866
(1975), aff'd, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976); Bratt v. I.B.M. Corp., 392 Mass. 508,
509, 467 N.E.2d 126, 129 (1984).
125. E.g., Stearns v. Ohio Sav. Ass'n, 15 Ohio App. 3d 18, 20,472 N.E.2d 372, 374-75
(1984) (privilege did not extend to circulating to other employees defamatory publica-
tion concerning discharge).
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privacy invasion-the public disclosure of private facts. If an em-
ployer publicly discloses AIDS test results, even if true, and that dis-
closure would be objectionable to a person of ordinary sensibilities,
a claim for invasion of privacy might succeed. 12 6
c. Emotional Distress.-An intentional or negligent infliction of
emotional distress claim might be joined to other causes of action if
the employer's conduct in releasing the information is extreme and
outrageous.' 27 The manner in which the employer discloses test re-
sults, or its actions after learning the result, might support this
claim.' 28 If the employer acts "beyond all possible bounds of de-
cency,"' 129 then the employee may be entitled to damages.
C. Other Remedies for AIDS Victims
1. Unemployment Compensation.-Employees who voluntarily re-
sign from their positions must prove they had good cause to quit
and that they are able and available for other employment before
they can receive unemployment benefits.13 0 "Good cause" is neces-
sarily a relative term because states differ in their interpretation of
the phrase.'' While some states consider any employee illness
"good cause" for a voluntary resignation, most restrict "good
cause" to illnesses resulting from work-related causes.' 3 2 In those
states, AIDS victims forced to quit due to illness would not qualify
for benefits because the disease is not "work-related," unless, of
126. See Forsher v. Bugliosi, 26 Cal. 3d 792, 808-09, 608 P.2d 716, 725, 163 Cal. Rptr.
628, 637 (1980) (stating elements of action for invasion of privacy); cf. Fry v. Ionia Senti-
nel-Standard, 101 Mich. App. 725, 731, 300 N.W.2d 687, 689 (1980) (enunciating a test
that disclosed information must be "highly offensive to a reasonable person and of no
legitimate concern to the public").
127. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comments d, j, k (1965) ("liability has
been found .. .where the conduct has been so outrageous in character .... as to go
beyond all possible bounds of decency").
128. Perhaps a general, public announcement to all employees that the plaintiff has
AIDS or abusive or rude treatment after the diagnosis would constitute sufficiently out-
rageous conduct.
129. See supra note 127. Thus, even if the employee in fact is a homosexual person or
a drug user, or has AIDS, a cause of action for emotional distress may still lie if the
employer disseminates the information in an "outrageous" fashion.
130. See NATIONAL FOUND. FOR UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION AND WORKERS' COM-
PENSATION, HIGHLIGHTS OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION LAWS 3 (Jan. 1985)
(available at Suite 603, 600 Maryland Ave., S.W., Wash., D.C. 20024).
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., McKnight v. Daniels, 268 Ark. 1056, 1057-58, 598 S.W.2d 436, 437 (Ark.
Ct. App. 1980); Duffy v. Lab. & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 556 S.W.2d 195, 198 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1977) (chronic back ailment and personal illness do not constitute good cause to
leave work voluntarily).
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course, they could establish that they were exposed to it through
work contacts. Moreover, even if the illness need not be connected
to employment, individuals with AIDS still would be denied benefits
in most states if they are not available to perform other suitable
work that might arise.13 3 For those who leave work due to harass-
ment, however, unemployment benefits might be available under
either constructive discharge or resignation for good cause
theories. 13 4
Ironically, a friend or relative who leaves the job to care for an
AIDS victim may fare better under unemployment compensation
laws than the victim. For example, a California unemployment
board recently concluded that a man who voluntarily quit his job to
care for a "family partner" afflicted with AIDS was entitled to unem-
ployment compensation.'1 5 The employer had initially granted the
employee a two-month leave of absence but denied a request for
additional time, whereupon the employee resigned. A California
133. See, e.g., Fico v. Catherwood, 29 A.D.2d 1011, 289 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1968) (woman
denied benefits because her physical disabilities limited her availability for other work);
Carter v. Commission, Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 65 Pa. Commw.
569, 573, 442 A.2d 1245, 1248 (1982) ("[c]laimant must be able to work and be avail-
able for suitable work in order to be entitled to benefits. Unemployment compensation
is not health insurance and it does not cover the physically or mentally ill during the
periods they are unemployable").
134. See, e.g., Richards v. Daniels, 1 Ark. App. 331, 615 S.W.2d 399 (1981) (teacher
voluntarily quit with good cause after being mistreated by other teachers and principal
when she refused to sign a petition); Condo v. Board of Review, Dep't of Lab. & Indus.,
158 N.J. Super. 172, 385 A.2d 920 (1978) (employee who was continually threatened
with physical harm by co-worker had good cause to leave employment). But cf. Larson v.
Department of Economic Security, 281 N.W.2d 667 (Minn. 1979) (because a harassed
employee's failure to inform employer of co-workers' conduct did not allow employer to
remedy the situation, employee was deemed to have voluntarily resigned without good
cause).
Note that AIDS victims who leave their jobs because of abuse resulting in unbear-
able working conditions may have a cause of action for discriminatory constructive dis-
charge under the applicable discrimination laws discussed earlier. See supra notes 56-57
and accompanying text. Generally an employee must prove the employer deliberately
caused or allowed the working environment to become so intolerable that the employee
was forced into an involuntary resignation. See, e.g., Johnson v. Nordstrom-Larpenteur
Agency, 623 F.2d 1279, 1281 (8th Cir. 1980); Young v. Southwestern Say. & Loan Ass'n,
509 F.2d 140, 144 (5th Cir. 1975); J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 461 F.2d 490, 494 (4th
Cir. 1972) (Title VII constructive discharge claim). To prove that the resignation was
involuntary, the employee must show that a reasonable person in the employee's shoes
would have felt compelled to resign. See, e.g., Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d
61, 65 (5th Cir. 1980); Beye v. Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, 59 Md. App. 642, 652, 477 A.2d
1197, 1202 (1984). Employers who harass workers because of their affliction with AIDS,
or are aware of such harassment and allow it to continue, may face such federal and state
constructive discharge claims.
135. No. SF-24774 (Cal. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. Sept. 13, 1985), reported in
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 208, at A-8 (Oct. 28, 1985).
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administrative law judge found "good cause" for the employee's de-
cision to leave work temporarily to care for an ill family member or
relative. The judge concluded that although the partner was not
related through blood or marriage, "it is recognized that nonblood,
nonlegal relationships may be established which are meaningful, if
not more meaningful, than relationships created by blood or the
bonds of marriage."' 3 6
2. ERISA.-Section 510 of the Employment Retirement In-
come Security Act' 3 7 prohibits an employer from firing an employee
in order to interfere with the attainment of any right to which the
employee may become entitled under an employee benefit plan.
Thus, employers may not fire employees before they qualify for a
benefit plan or before their rights vest under the plan, for the pur-
pose of preventing qualification or vesting. 138 Employers who dis-
cover in the early days of an employee's tenure that the employee
has AIDS-that is, through test results or voluntary disclosures
before insurance coverage applies-should bear in mind that the
employee might claim that this, rather than a job-related problem,
was the reason for discharge and seek a remedy under ERISA.
D. What Are the Rights of the Co- Workers of an AIDS Victim?
1. Co- Workers' Resistance to Working with AIDS Victims Generally.-
In addition to dealing with the employee who suffers from AIDS,
employers must consider the concerns and rights of the co-workers
of AIDS victims. Frequently employees will want to know who
among their customers, patients, or co-workers has AIDS and may
want to avoid contact with those individuals.
Two recent cases illustrate the potential variety of problems
and the range of settings in which they can occur. In the first case, a
Minnesota arbitrator reinstated a prison guard who because of his
fear of contracting AIDS had been discharged for refusing to con-
136. Id. Cf. Cantrell v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 450 S.W.2d 235, 236-
37 (Ky. 1970) (woman who took time off to nurse dying husband and was replaced did
not leave voluntarily without good cause); Balduyck v. Employment Div., 72 Or. App.
242, 695 P.2d 944 (1985) (employee who took time off to assist ailing mother entitled to
benefits when she was replaced).
137. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1982).
138. See, e.g., Kross v. Western Elec. Co., 701 F.2d 1238, 1243 (7th Cir. 1983) (plain-
tiff had cause of action under § 510 based on claim that he was discharged to deprive
him of participation in the company life and medical insurance plans); Folz v. Marriott
Corp., 594 F. Supp. 1007, 1014-15 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (employer violated § 510 by dis-
charging an employee with multiple sclerosis in order to deny him employee benefit
plans).
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duct pat-down searches on prisoners. 3 9 Upon learning that a new
inmate had AIDS-related complex (ARC), the prison warden had is-
sued two memoranda, one to guards and the other to inmates.
Although the memorandum to the guards simply advised that a pris-
oner had ARC and that fears of contagion were unwarranted, the
memo to inmates cautioned that "no one really knows all the ways
AIDS is transmitted, so be careful. Wash your hands regularly and
practice good hygiene." Thereafter, the grievant refused to conduct
pat-down searches unless allowed to wear gloves. His request was
denied and he was discharged for failing to obey direct orders from
his supervisor.
The arbitrator reinstated the guard without pay for two rea-
sons. First, he found that the correctional institution, through its
memorandum to the inmates, had reinforced the grievant's fear.
Second, the warden had later changed his mind about permitting
guards to wear gloves during pat-down searches and the arbitrator
determined that he had done so as an accommodation to the rea-
sonable fears expressed by other guards. Thus, the arbitrator con-
cluded that, although refusals to work ordinarily would be sufficient
grounds for discharge, in this case the employer was "at least partly
responsible" for the employee's "exaggerated fear of contracting
the disease." 
140
In the second case, Pawlisch v. Bany,' 4 ' the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals upheld the discharge of a county health board member who
was fired because of his prejudice against persons afflicted with
AIDS, over claims that the firing violated the board member's first
amendment right of free speech. At a board meeting discussion of a
resolution on AIDS, Pawlisch had stated: "'Homosexual sex is im-
moral and unnatural. Even animals know better than to do that.
With that kind of behavior, you have to pay the piper.'""' The
county executive promptly demanded Pawlisch's resignation be-
cause of the executive's doubt that Pawlisch could act on health poli-
cies without discriminating against the homosexual community.
When Pawlisch refused to resign, the county removed him from the
board. The court ruled that Pawlisch held a policymaking position
and that the elected chief executive's need to demand harmony with
his nondiscrimination policies was a requirement for the job suffi-
139. Minnesota Dep't of Corrections, No. 85M-XVI-600-3183 (Dec. 10, 1985) (Gal-
lagher, Arb.), reported in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at A-4 (Feb. 7, 1986).
140. Id.
141. 126 Wis. 2d 162, 376 N.W.2d 368 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985).
142. Id. at 164, 376 N.W.2d at 370.
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cient to override Pawlisch's first amendment rights. 143
As these two cases suggest, an employee's right to know
whether anyone in the work environment is infected with AIDS, or
to voice opposition or refuse to work with AIDS victims, will vary
depending on the work setting and other peculiarities of the situa-
tion at hand. For example, provisions in labor agreements and em-
ployee handbooks (in states in which such handbooks create
contractual rights) on subjects such as disciplinary rules, grounds
for discharge, physical exams, confidentiality of employee informa-
tion, health and safety, and employee privacy rights should always
be reviewed. In some states or locales the matter may be governed
by a local ordinance. Special rules may apply in the public sector in
which, as in Pawlisch, political considerations or personnel regula-
tions may be present. In addition, most employers will need to re-
view the rights of protesting employees in light of the federal
statutes discussed below.
In general, the more information about AIDS an employer has
provided to its employees, the greater the employer's chances of be-
ing able to show the unreasonableness of the employee protests.
Moreover, to the extent that AIDS victims are protected by handicap
or other antidiscrimination statutes, an employer may not discharge
AIDS employees because co-workers or customers prefer to avoid
contact with those employees. 144
2. Obligations Under the National Labor Relations Act.--a. Duty to
Bargain.-Section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act requires
that the employer and union bargain "in good faith with respect to
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.' ' 45
Safety rules and practices are "conditions of employment" under
this section. 146 In those work environments in which the presence
or potential transmission of AIDS clearly poses a threat to worker
143. Id. at 167, 376 N.W.2d at 372.
144. Customer or co-worker preference is never a justification for discrimination, ex-
cept perhaps in the rare instance when the customer or co-worker preference goes to the
very essence of the business operation, which would be undermined if the preference
was not honored. See Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1199 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971) (passenger preference for unmarried stewardesses insuf-
ficient to justify airlines' "no-marriage" rule); Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, 442
F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971) (airline passenger preference
for female flight attendants insufficient to justify exclusion of males from job).
145. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
146. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gulf Power Co., 384 F.2d 822, 825 (5th Cir. 1967); cf. San
Isabel Elec. Serv., Inc., 225 N.L.R.B. 1073, 1078 n.6 (1976) (safety rules also subject of
mandatory bargaining under the Labor Management Relations Act).
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safety, employers may have to bargain in good faith over any pro-
posed AIDS policy or testing program covering unionized
workers. 14
7
If AIDS is a subject for mandatory bargaining, several issues
arise regarding the flow of information between the employer and
union concerning AIDS victims in the workplace. The employer's
duty to bargain in good faith includes an additional duty to supply
the union with "requested information that will enable [the union]
to negotiate effectively and to perform properly its other duties as
bargaining representative." 148 At some point, a union may demand
information pertaining to the health of employees suspected to be
AIDS victims, raising the issue of the employer's obligation to dis-
close such information as part of its duty to bargain.
Indeed, in Oil, Chemical &Atomic Workers Local Union No. 6-418 v.
NLRB 141 the union contended that, in order to bargain effectively
on issues pertaining to health and safety, it needed various company
health and safety records, including worker mortality statistics, labo-
ratory studies of employees, and health information obtained
through workers' compensation and insurance claims.' 50 The com-
panies objected to the release of the information. The court held
that if the employers could delete from the records names and any
other information that could link the record to a specific employee,
releasing the information would not violate employees' rights to pri-
vacy and confidentiality.' Union requests for information about
the incidence of AIDS in the workplace might be handled in the
same way.
147. Cf., e.g., International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local System Council, U-9 v. Met-
ropolitan Edison Co., No. 86-4426 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 1986) (WESTLAW, Allfeds li-
brary) (granting temporary restraining order blocking random testing unilaterally
implemented by employer pending arbitration on the matter); International Bhd. of
Elec. Workers, Local 1900 v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 634 F. Supp. 642, 645 (D.D.C.
1986) (denying preliminary injunction of unilaterally revised drug testing program after
employer agreed to limit testing to the scope of previous policy pending outcome of
arbitration); Murray v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., No. 7692/86 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Kings
County April 1, 1986) (granting temporary restraining order halting unilaterally imple-
mented random urine drug testing program pending arbitration). But see Brotherhood
of Maintenance of Way v. Burlington Northern R.R., 802 F.2d 1016, 1024 (8th Cir.
1986) (upholding unilaterally implemented drug testing program as necessary adjunct
to enforcement of disciplinary rules).
148. Local 13, Detroit Newspaper Printing & Graphic Communications Union v.
NLRB, 598 F.2d 267, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
149. 711 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
150. Id. at 352-53, 355, 356-57.
151. Id. at 363.
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b. "Concerted Activity" Under Section 7.-Section 7 of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act 152 gives workers the right "to engage in
... concerted activities for the purpose of ... mutual aid or protec-
tion." 153 Both union and nonunion employees may be protected
when they protest what they in good faith reasonably believe to be an
unsafe working condition. 4 5 Terminating employees who act in
concert to oppose the employment of an individual with AIDS, or
who refuse to perform services for an AIDS victim may therefore
violate employee rights under section 7. So far, no National Labor
Relations Board decision has addressed the issue of whether, given
the current medical evidence that AIDS is not spread through casual
contacts, the fear of contracting AIDS through the workplace could
be a "reasonable and honest belief" justifying protection under sec-
tion 7 .55 Even if employees who walk off the job in concert to pro-
test a requirement that they work with AIDS victims are engaged in
"protected concerted activity," however, they may be "permanently
replaced" (although not discharged) if the protest does not pertain
to any unfair labor practice by the employer. 15 6
3. Obligations Under Section 502 of the Labor Management Relations
Act.-Most unionized employees are covered by a collective bargain-
ing agreement containing clauses that require them to arbitrate
rather than strike over disputes concerning work conditions covered
by the labor agreement. Under section 502 of the Labor Manage-
ment and Relations Act, 1 57 however, individuals or employee
groups do not violate a no-strike clause in a labor agreement when
they walk off the job "in good faith because of abnormally dangerous
152. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
153. Id.
154. See NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 837 (1984) (employee's
action must be based on a "reasonable and honest belief"). But cf. Quality C.A.T.V.,
Inc., 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1297 (NLRB Mar. 27, 1986) (if concerted protest was not
violent or disruptive, "reasonableness of workers' decisions to engage in concerted ac-
tivity is irrelevant" and refusal to work to protest uncomfortable working conditions or
supervisor's lack of concern is protected).
155. One commentator has suggested that workers could use the "fear of contagion"
exception created in the Justice Department Memorandum on § 504 to justify their
"honest belief." See Michael Cecere, Comments to the Am. Bar Ass'n Annual Meeting
(Aug. 10, 1986), reported in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 156, at A-8 (Aug. 13, 1986).
156. Employees who strike to protest an employer's unfair labor practice are entitled
to reinstatement even if the employer has hired permanent replacements. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938). Workers who strike for
economic reasons (any reason that is neither caused nor prolonged by an unfair labor
practice committed by the employer), however, may be permanently replaced during the
strike and the employer is under no duty to reinstate them at the end of the strike. Id.
157. 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1982).
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conditions for work at the place of employment .... 1,58
Note, though, that "the reasonable and honest belief" that
would entitle workers to the protection of section 7 of the NLRA
may not be sufficient to satisfy the section 502 "good faith" require-
ment. The Supreme Court held in Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine
Workers' 5 9 that a work stoppage under section 502 must be sup-
ported by "ascertainable, objective evidence" that the condition is
an abnormally dangerous condition. " Given this evidentiary re-
quirement, it is unlikely that employees could justify walking off the
job merely because a co-worker has AIDS or has tested positive for
exposure to the virus. Although employees may argue that re-
searchers have not answered all questions concerning the disease,
currently there is simply no "ascertainable, objective evidence" to
support a conclusion that the presence of an AIDS victim in the
workplace poses an "abnormally dangerous condition."
4. Occupational Safety And Health Laws.--a. OSHA Standards on
Exposure to Illness in the Workplace. -Under the Federal Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA),' 6 ' employers generally have
two duties: a specific duty to comply with all occupational safety and
health standards promulgated by the government, and a general
duty to furnish employment in a workplace "free from recognized
hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physi-
cal harm .... "" OSHA also prohibits employers from retaliating
against employees who refuse to be exposed to a health hazard that
they have asked the employer to correct and that they in good faith
reasonably believe poses a danger of death or serious injury. 1 6 1 Em-
ployers who have sufficiently educated their employees about AIDS
should be able to show that employee fears are unreasonable in
most cases.
Currently, there is no federal occupational safety and health
standard dealing specifically with AIDS in the workplace. The failure
to take reasonable steps to protect employees against the risk of
contracting a disease via exposure in the workplace, however, has
been recognized as a violation of OSHA's general duty clause. For
158. Id. (emphasis added).
159. 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
160. Id. at 387; accord Economy Tank Line, 99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1198 (NLRB July 31,
1978).
161. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982).
162. Id. at § 654(a)(1).
163. See id. at § 660(c)(1); Marshall v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 7 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA)
2021 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
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example, an employer may violate the general duty clause by failing
to vaccinate employees at risk of contracting anthrax. 1"'
To establish a general duty clause violation, the government
must prove that: (1) the employer failed to render its workplace free
of the hazard;1 65 (2) the hazard was recognized either by the cited
employer or generally within the employer's industry; 1 66 (3) the haz-
ard was causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm; 67
and (4) there was a feasible means by which the employer could
have eliminated or materially reduced the hazard.' 68 Given current
medical information about AIDS, it is not likely that either allowing
seropositive employees to continue working or requiring employees
to work with AIDS patients would violate OSHA's general duty
clause. 169 Nevertheless, it might be a general duty violation for
those employers obliged to follow the CDC guidelines to fail to do
SO. 170
b. The OSHA "Access Standard."-The "Access Standard," a
federal occupational and health standard promulgated under
OSHA, imposes an obligation upon employers who create medical
and exposure records to ensure that employees and designated rep-
resentatives have access to those records. 17' The standard defines
"employee exposure record" broadly enough to include a specific
virus, such as the HTLV-III virus responsible for AIDS, that has
been shown to cause an acute or chronic health hazard. 172 Thus, if
an employer establishes an AIDS testing program, it probably would
164. See Secretary of Lab. v. Peter Cooper Corps., 10 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1203 (Occu-
pational Safety & Health Review Comm'n Nov. 23, 1981).
165. Continental Oil Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 630 F.2d
446, 448 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981).
166. St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 647
F.2d 840, 845 (8th Cir. 1981).
167. Continental Oil Co., 630 F.2d at 448.
168. Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 622
F.2d 1160, 1164 (3d Cir. 1980).
169. Cf. Bernales v. City & County of San Francisco, Nos. 11-17001-1 to 11-17001-4
(Cal. Lab. Comm'n), reported in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 184, at A-6 (Sept. 9, 1985)
(nurses' safety was not jeopardized by the hospital's refusal to permit them to wear per-
sonal protective equipment when treating AIDS patients).
170. For a discussion of the CDC guidelines, see supra note 5.
171. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.20(e)(2) (1986).
172. Id. at § 1910.20(c)(5), (11). Subsection (c)(5) states in relevant part: " 'Em-
ployee exposure record' means a record containing any... information concerning...
[b]iological monitoring results which directly assess the absorption of a substance or
agent by body systems." Subsection (c)(l 1) states in relevant part: " 'Toxic substance or
harmful physical agent' means any ... biological agent (bacteria, virus, fungus, etc.) ....
which.. . [h]as yielded positive evidence of an acute or chronic health hazard in human,
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be creating employee exposure records under the Access Standard,
and individual employees or their designated representatives would
be entitled to view these records.1 73
IV. CONCLUSION
There is much yet to learn about AIDS and ARC. As AIDS
spreads and medical knowledge develops, the legal issues will
emerge with greater clarity. For the moment, at least, education of
the workforce is the best way to prevent and resolve conflicts among
AIDS victims, co-workers, and employers. 174
animal or other biological testing conducted by, or known to, the employer .... (em-
phasis added).
173. Employees are entitled to receive their own medical records from the employer.
Id. at § 1910.20 (e)(2)(ii)(A). Alternatively, employees may authorize a designated repre-
sentative (an individual or union) to receive the records. Id. at § 1910.20 (e)(2)(ii)(B).
The regulations provide that an employer can withhold records if the requested records
concern a terminal illness and the employer's physician believes direct access to the
records could be detrimental to the employee's health. Id. at § 1910.20 (e)(2)(ii)(D).
This exception is easily defeated, however, because the employer must provide the same
information if requested by a designated representative. This release is permitted even
if it is known that the records will be passed on to the employee. Id.
174, Although no national education program has been established to deal with the
repercussions arising from the AIDS crisis, employers can contact state and local health
departments to obtain the basic scientific facts about AIDS.
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